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CROSSING THE ELECTRONIC BORDER:
FREE SPEECH PROTECTION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL INTERNET
INTRODUCTION
Worldwide access to materials published on websites in the United
States has created porous national borders in cyberspace. The global
scope of the Internet poses challenges to traditional free speech analy-
sis because anyone in any country potentially can access information
online. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
tects speech by providing that "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech."1 Because no international treaty to date
ensures this guarantee of freedom of speech on the Internet, the laws
of individual countries govern the access to information online within
their respective borders. By posting information on the Internet, peo-
ple subject their speech to the laws of different countries, and conflicts
between the laws of multiple jurisdictions are therefore inescapable.
If an American posts information on the Internet that the First
Amendment protects in the United States, that information could vio-
late the laws of France, China, or any other country that regulates
expression on the Internet when accessed abroad. Therefore, Ameri-
cans could violate laws abroad without ever setting foot on foreign
soil. To solve this problem, this Comment makes two recommenda-
tions. First, U.S. courts should apply U.S. defamation law to the In-
ternet to protect the speech of American citizens and Internet Service
Providers, such as Yahoo!, AOL, AT&T, and Prodigy (collectively
ISPs). Second, the international community should adopt a Global
Free Speech Act for the Internet modeled on the standards of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.2
The intense process of globalization and current advances in tech-
nology enable "more and more people, with more and more home
computers, modems, cellular phones, cable systems and Internet con-
nections, to reach farther and farther, into more and more countries,
faster and faster, deeper and deeper, cheaper and cheaper than ever
before in history."'3 The Internet is an increasingly influential medium
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
3. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXIJS AND THE OLIVE TREE 47 (Anchor Books 2000) (exam-
ining the new system of globalization that developed in the aftermath of the Cold War and the
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of communication because it facilitates unprecedented levels of ex-
pression and the exchange of ideas by allowing anyone with computer
access to "build a soap box out of web pages and speak her mind in
the virtual village green to an audience larger and more diverse than
any the Framers could have imagined." 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has
described the Internet as "a unique and wholly new medium of world-
wide human communication" with content "as diverse as human
thought." 5
Rapid developments in the Internet provide for robust conversation
and the spread of ideas; however, these advances in technology create
numerous issues that the framers of the Constitution never antici-
pated.6 Internet filters, for example, block certain types of informa-
tion to a particular audience, but also potentially prevent access to
information that the First Amendment protects.7 In United States v.
American Library Ass'n, the Supreme Court examined challenges to a
federal statute requiring public libraries that receive federal funds to
install filtering software on computers that would prevent patrons
from viewing pornography or obscene materials that are harmful to
children. 8 In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the statute, finding that
tension it has created with group efforts to preserve the importance of culture, geography, tradi-
tion, and community). Friedman notes that, during the Cold War, the two most frequently asked
questions were: (1) "Whose side are you on?" and (2) "How big is your missile?" Id. at 10. The
new popular questions under the system of globalization are: (1) "To what extent are you con-
nected to everyone?" and (2) "How fast is your modem?" Id.
4. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000),
vacated sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). For a brief discussion of the history
of the Internet, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 62-67.
5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850, 852 (1997). In Reno v. ACLU, the district court de-
scribed the Internet as "a never-ending worldwide conversation" and as "the most participatory
form of mass speech yet developed." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
6. Professor Bollinger notes that there is little evidence as to what the actual intentions of the
Framers were, but the evidence in existence "suggests something far different from, and more
limited than, what has evolved in this country." LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 5 (1986); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 & n.3 (1988) (noting that "[a]ttempts to
develop a first amendment jurisprudence based on historical evidence regarding the intent of the
framers have proven quite manipulable"). Because "no clear, consistent vision of what the fram-
ers meant by freedom of speech" has or is likely to emerge, the Supreme Court has focused less
on original intent when dealing with freedom of speech than it has with other constitutional
provisions. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.1,
at 924 (3d ed. 2006).
7. See Mark C. Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political Viability: The Case
of Internet Pornography, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 977, 1016 (2001) ("[F]iltering software
does not necessarily do what it is designed to, and it also is imprecise in what it does. While it
may block a majority of pornographic sites, it also blocks legitimate, constitutionally protected
sites.").
8. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2003).
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it did not violate the First Amendment because adults could still ac-
cess the material if they requested that the library lift the filter.9 In
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that because some library patrons
would feel uncomfortable asking for obscene materials to be un-
blocked, the "interest of the authors of those works in reaching the
widest possible audience would be abridged."10 Justice Stevens rea-
soned that the law "prohibits reading without official consent" be-
cause "[u]ntil a blocked site or group of sites is unblocked, a patron is
unlikely to know what is being hidden and therefore whether there is
any point in asking for the filter to be removed.""1 By this view, the
statute serves as a prior restraint on speech and thus is suspect under
American constitutional law.12
More urgently, courts must determine the applicability of First
Amendment protection for speech posted on the websites of ISPs
when that information is accessible outside of the United States. 13 In
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, Ya-
hoo!-an ISP incorporated in Delaware but with its principal place of
business and computer servers in California-operated a U.S. website
and several comparable websites in foreign countries, where it offered
Internet services that included a search engine, email, auctions, and
chat rooms.1 4 French citizens were able to access Nazi memorabilia
on auction sites and information denying the Holocaust through the
U.S. and French versions of Yahoo!'s website, even though French law
prohibits this type of information.15 A French court of first instance
issued injunctions against Yahoo! on the grounds that both versions of
its website violated French law by providing French citizens access to
prohibited hate speech. 16 Yahoo! sought a declaratory judgment from
a U.S. district court that the French orders were unenforceable in the
United States. 17 The district court held that the First Amendment
precluded enforcement of the French order in the United States be-
cause the order would limit Yahoo!'s speech.1 8
9. Id. at 209, 214; see infra note 90.
10. Am. Library Ass'n. 539 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 224-25.
12. Id. at 225.
13. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1186 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
14. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201-02
(9th Cir. 2006).
15. Id. at 1202-03.
16. Id. at 1202-04.
17. Id. at 1204.
18. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
2009]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:491
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that judgments of for-
eign courts are typically enforceable unless they are contrary to public
policy, which includes decisions running afoul of the First Amend-
ment. 19 Under that logic, the injunctions issued by the French court
would be unenforceable if they violated the First Amendment. 20 The
Ninth Circuit did not decide this issue, however, because it held that
the suit was not ripe for adjudication.21 Accordingly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit remanded the case to the district court and instructed it to dismiss
the claim without prejudice. 22 While not ruling on the issue, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the extraterritorial application of the First Amend-
ment is a difficult and unresolved issue.23
19. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1213-17; accord Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.
1995); see Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)
(noting in dicta that refusal to recognize a foreign judgment should be "constitutionally
mandatory" if the judgment were repugnant to the policies and principles embodied in the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the free speech guarantee of the New York
Constitution).
20. As explained by the district court, "No legal judgment has any effect, of its own force,
beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived." Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp.
2d at 1192. Thus, for foreign judgments to have effect in the United States, U.S. courts must
enforce them. Under the principle of comity, "United States courts generally recognize foreign
judgments and decrees unless enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to the country's
interest." Id. (citing Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971)); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-67 (1895) (discussing the "comity of na-
tions"). It is not enough, however, that a foreign judgment be inconsistent with American law
"to prevent recognition and enforcement ... in the United States"; U.S. courts would still recog-
nize such judgments. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1215. Rather, the foreign judgment "must be ...
repugnant to public policy" for U.S. courts to refuse to enforce the judgment. Id. For a thor-
ough discussion of the status of foreign judgments in the United States, see generally Robert B.
von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401
(1977).
21. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1224. An eight-judge majority held that the "district court properly
exercised specific personal jurisdiction" over the defendants, but a three-judge plurality held that
the suit was unripe for decision. Overall, six of the eleven judges voted to dismiss the suit: three
dissenting judges who concluded that there was no personal jurisdiction and the three-judge
plurality that held the suit was not ripe for decision. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1217-18. Kurt Wimmer reviews the questions left open by the Ninth Circuit:
If the United States wishes to protect Nazi speech, the domestic law of France should
not be able to undermine the United States's ability to do so. But should those who
would be willing to avoid the laws of their country be able to establish virtual web
presences within the United States to frustrate the application of their own states' laws
against them? And on the other hand, should a court in Australia or Canada be able to
try a U.S. publisher for defamation under their own countries' standards when the only
connection between that publisher and the forum state is the publication of content
that can be downloaded from the Internet in that state?
Kurt Wimmer, Toward a World Rule of Law: Freedom of Expression, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 202, 203-04 (2006).
The issues and consequences raised by the Internet are also illustrated by the ability of
Germans to order Mein Kampf, the infamous political manifesto written by Adolf Hitler,
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The ongoing war on terror also raises the stakes of this First
Amendment issue. Terrorists can take advantage of the Internet's
"ability to link geographically dispersed individuals to changing data
without the filtering provided by traditional media. '24 They can com-
municate valuable information about potential targets for attacks
through websites, and they can update the sites as new information
becomes available. 25 The Internet's "unmediated nature" allows ex-
tremist groups to "attract an audience of persons who already agree
with the extreme opinions featured on the site" and to promote "re-
cruitment for violent acts."'26
If the global community recognizes First Amendment-type speech
protection, the United States potentially could protect ISPs from the
enforcement of foreign judgments that are part of foreign anti-terror-
ism policies. 27 However, without a Global Free Speech Act, Ameri-
cans may be viewed as committing terrorist acts. Suppose that an
American citizen posted a disparaging comment about Venezuela's
through Amazon.com, despite the prohibition on the sale or publication of the work in Ger-
many. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 37. Thomas Friedman notes that books ordered by German
citizens came in the mail "in a way that the German government was powerless to stop. Indeed,
so many Germans ordered Mein Kampf from Amazon.com that in the summer of 1999 Hitler
made Amazon.com's top-ten bestseller list for Germany." Id. Amazon.com initially decided to
continue shipping copies of Mein Kampf to Germany, refusing to determine what its customers
were allowed to read and arguing that the English translation did not violate the German censor-
ship law. Id. However, Amazon.com received so many angry emails from around the world in
response to its policy that it eventually stopped selling the work online. Id.
24. Peter Margulies, The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and the First
Amendment, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, para. 1, http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2004/
04_041207_margulies.php.
25. Id. para. 43.
26. Id. para. 42.
27. For example, Turkey might choose to define particular statements regarding Kurdish inde-
pendence as terrorist speech. If that speech is posted on a U.S. ISP's website and is accessed in
Turkey, a Turkish court could enter judgment against the ISP for violating domestic law. That
judgment would be enforceable by U.S. courts if no First Amendment protection were recog-
nized for speech accessible abroad. On the other hand, if courts recognized free speech protec-
tion and found the judgment unenforceable, the United States would inhibit Turkey's efforts to
fight terrorism. For the news story that inspired this hypothetical, see generally James Janega,
Iraq Prods PKK to Halt Border Raids, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2007, at C12.
This issue is complicated further by the elusiveness of a definition of terrorism. Noam Chom-
sky notes two definitions of "terrorism" that are used by the U.S. and British governments: "the
calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or
ideological in nature.., through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear," or "the use, or threat,
of action which is violent, damaging or disrupting, and is intended to influence the government
or intimidate the public and is for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological
cause." NOAM CHOMSKY, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA'S QUEST FOR GLOBAL DOMI-
NANCE 188 (2003) (alteration in original). With such fluid and confusing terms, it is possible for
actions to be decried as terrorist acts by one country, yet be considered acceptable behavior by
another.
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antagonistic president, Hugo Chavez, on an Internet message board
and thus made that information accessible not only in the United
States, but also in Venezuela. Assuming that the statement violated
Venezuelan sedition laws, Venezuelan courts could find the American
guilty of committing terrorist acts against Venezuela. Absent First
Amendment protection for that speech, the judgment would be en-
forceable in the United States and the American would be labeled a
criminal and a terrorist for what he thought was the exercise of his
First Amendment rights. In order to prevent such results, the United
States should recognize domestic free speech protection for Internet
speech accessible 'abroad and advocate for the adoption of interna-
tional free speech protection based on the Berne Convention. By tak-
ing these complementary steps, the United States will ensure that
Americans' First Amendment rights are protected on the Internet.
This Comment argues that U.S. courts should recognize free speech
protection for speech on the Internet that is accessible abroad and
further argues that the global community should adopt a Global Free
Speech Act. Part II examines U.S. defamation law for printed materi-
als and then considers the Supreme Court's approach to the In-
ternet.28 Part III discusses the applicability of defamation law to
materials posted on the Internet, the legal implications of free speech
on the Internet, Internet filtering as an alternative, and the extent of
ISP liability when third parties post material to ISP websites. 29 Part
IV addresses the foundations of international free speech and identi-
fies the history and principles of the Berne Convention as a roadmap
for international free speech protection. It ultimately argues for the
institution of a Global Free Speech Act modeled on the standards of
the Berne Convention.30
II. BACKGROUND: DEFAMATION LAW AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S APPROACH TO THE INTERNET
The First Amendment's general text provides little guidance to
courts as they develop free speech principles, 31 and the text has left
courts "adrift on a sea of possible interpretations of the First Amend-
28. See infra notes 31-93 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 94-180 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 181-249 and accompanying text.
31. BOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 6. Professor Laurence Tribe recognizes the difficulties posed
by First Amendment jurisprudence when he discusses "the central question posed by the Consti-
tution's most majestic guarantee":
[lI]s the freedom of speech to be regarded only as a means to some further end-like
successful self-government, or social stability, or (somewhat less instrumentally) the
discovery and dissemination of truth-or is freedom of speech in part also an end in
[Vol. 58:491
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ment. ' '32 For example, the First Amendment does not clarify whether
free speech protection applies to speech accessible beyond the territo-
rial borders of the United States. Notwithstanding this lack of textual
guidance, the First Amendment remains one of the most cherished
constitutional provisions for Americans; 33 it is "one of our foremost
cultural symbols" and "an important piece of the American charac-
ter."' 34 As Justice Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental princi-
ple of the American government. They recognized the risks to
which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order
cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infrac-
tion; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagina-
tion; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that
hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones.
35
In agreement with this principle, the U.S. Supreme Court held in its
first major decision of the Internet era, Reno v. ACLU, that there is no
basis "for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to this medium. '36 The Internet, therefore, is enti-
tled to the same free speech protection as print mediums.37
Before considering how this powerful American free speech right
translates abroad, Section A discusses defamation law, which provides
the backdrop for analyzing free speech issues in the context of the
itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to become and the sort of persons we
wish to be?
TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-1, at 785.
32. BOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 5-6. The development of First Amendment case law has
been more complex than the Amendment's simple text suggests. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
6, § 11.1.1, at 923-24. While many people believe that the First Amendment confers an absolute
right to free speech that allows them to say whatever they want whenever they want, they are
mistaken. The First Amendment, for example, does not allow a person to shout "Fire!" in a
crowded theater when no such danger is present. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919); see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D.D.C.
1984) (discussing the types of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment and the
categories of lower-value speech that receive limited free speech protection). But see Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (holding that an individual's display of a four-letter exple-
tive on the back of his jacket inside a courtroom is protected by the First Amendment).
33. BOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 7-8.
34. Id. (emphasis omitted).
35. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
36. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
37. See id.; see also JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW: A FIELD GUIDE 4 (2006 ed.).
2009]
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Internet. 38 Section B examines the Supreme Court's approach to In-
ternet issues.39
A. Defamation Law
Defamation law protects an individual's most personal asset: his
name and reputation.40 According to Justice Stewart, protection of
one's reputation "reflects no more than our basic concept of the es-
sential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root
of any decent system of ordered liberty."'n A defamatory statement,
therefore, is one that injures the reputation of another.42 Under the
umbrella of defamation are two common law torts that punish state-
ments that are both defamatory and false: slander and libel.43
The Supreme Court has held that recovery for defamation is limited
by the First Amendment.44 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
seminal case on the issue, the police commissioner of Montgomery,
Alabama sued the New York Times and four clergymen for an adver-
tisement published in the newspaper, which criticized the way the
Montgomery police treated civil rights demonstrators and included
several false statements.45 The Supreme Court held that Alabama's
tort law violated the First Amendment and that in order to succeed on
a libel claim, the plaintiff, as a public figure, had to prove actual
malice.46
Justice Brennan stated that the United States exhibits a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials," and that in such a society, erro-
neous statements are inevitable. 47 Such speech must be protected "if
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
38. See infra notes 40-70 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 71-93 and accompanying text.
40. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.1 (2d ed. 2008).
41. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
42. HART, supra note 37, at 245.
43. Id. As one treatise explains, "libel is defamation by written or printed words, or by the
embodiment of the communication in some tangible or physical form, while slander consists of
communication of a defamatory statement by spoken words, or by transitory gestures." 1
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1.11.
44. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45. Id. at 256-58.
46. Id. at 264, 279-80. Under the actual malice standard, a plaintiff must prove that the defen-
dant's allegedly defamatory statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
47. Id. at 270-71.
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'need ... to survive.'"48 Under this precedent, even false statements
are protected because they further the underlying policies of the First
Amendment.49 Because of such countervailing free speech concerns,
in order to recover for libel or slander, plaintiffs must establish "not
only (1) that the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) that
the statement was made about the plaintiff; and (3) that the statement
was demonstrably false; but the plaintiff must also prove that the
statement was made with 'fault."' 50
Modern Internet First Amendment law is grounded in defamation
cases in which courts were asked to determine the extent of First
Amendment protections for speech published outside the United
States.51 The primary mode of communication in these cases was
print media, including newspaper articles, books, and films. 52 In ap-
plying the First Amendment to protect speech accessible abroad,
courts have taken positions along the spectrum of First Amendment
protection, leaving no consistent or unified line of cases.53
On one end of the spectrum is the position that the First Amend-
ment applies to all "extraterritorial publications by [U.S. citizens and]
persons under the protections of the Constitution. ' 54 The District
Court for Hawaii took this position in DeRoburt v. Gannett Co.,
where the president of Nauru brought an international defamation
suit against newspaper publishers for publishing articles claiming he
had committed serious crimes.55 The court held that both the English
common law of libel adopted by Nauru and the First Amendment
standards established in Sullivan and its progeny were applicable be-
cause the English common law by itself did not provide adequate safe-
guards to protect the newspaper publishers and their speech. 56
Because the First Amendment is fundamental to the U.S. "system of
48. Id. at 271-72 (alteration in original) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
49. See id. at 271; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
50. HART, supra note 37, at 245. For a public official or public figure, the level of fault re-
quired is actual malice, whereas for a private figure, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that
"the defendant was 'at fault' in publishing the false statement at issue." Id. at 245-46.
51. For a general discussion of the historical background of the First Amendment, see gener-
ally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 1:1-1:12 (2008).
52. See, e.g., Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 672 (N.D. Il. 1989), affd, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th
Cir. 1992); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 494 (C.D. Cal. 1986), afftd, 847 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1988); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 575 (D. Haw. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
53. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1217-18
(9th Cir. 2006).
54. Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 676; see DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 579-80.
55. DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 575-76.
56. Id. at 579-80.
20091 499
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constitutional democracy," it must be applied to all libel cases brought
in U.S. courts. 57 A federal district court in California also took this
position in Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, stating that "in the absence of
some overriding governmental interest such as national security, the
First Amendment protects the communications with foreign audiences
to the same extent as communications within our borders." 58
The court's approach in Desai v. Hersh59 falls in the middle of the
spectrum. An Indian official brought a defamation suit in U.S. federal
court against the American author of a book on Henry Kissinger that
was published in India.60 In the book, the author alleged that the offi-
cial sold Indian state secrets to the CIA during his tenure. 61 The dis-
trict court chose not to follow DeRoburt on the grounds that the
imposition of First Amendment safeguards extensively modified for-
eign laws, rendering them the "functional equivalent of American def-
amation law."'62 Unlike the court in DeRoburt or Justice Brandeis in
Whitney v. California,63 the court did not view the centrality of the
First Amendment to the American legal system as an overriding con-
cern. Rather, it concluded that "for purposes of suits brought in
United States courts, first amendment protections do not apply to all
extraterritorial publications by persons under the protections of the
Constitution. ' 64 The Court thereby adopted a sliding scale approach
to the First Amendment:
Had defendant written a book and published it solely in India con-
cerning plaintiff's activities as a public official in the government of
India, but minimally related to a matter of public concern in this
country, the need for protection of first amendment interests would
be greatly lessened, if not entirely absent. 65
Towards the opposite end of the spectrum, courts take the position
that the First Amendment applies minimally or not at all to speech
that is accessible abroad. 66 In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American
World Airways, the plaintiff airline brought suit against a group of
foreign airlines, alleging that "the defendants were involved in a con-
57. Id. at 579.
58. Bullfrog Films, Inc v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 847 F.2d 502 (9th
Cir. 1988).
59. Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992).
60. Id. at 671-72.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 675-76.
63. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
64. Desai 719 F. Supp. at 676.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D.D.C.
1984).
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spiracy to destroy Laker's transatlantic charters and its low-cost 'Sky-
train' service through a predatory pricing scheme and through
interference with Laker's attempts to obtain necessary financing. 67
The defendants argued that they had First Amendment free speech
protection to petition the British government for the redress of their
grievances. 68 In response, the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia stated in dicta, "It is well settled that the Constitution restrains
not only the power of the federal government to act in this country
but in many respects also its power to affect American citizens in for-
eign countries. '69 The court noted that "[iut is less clear ... whether
even American citizens are protected specifically by the First Amend-
ment with respect to their activities abroad."70
B. The Supreme Court's Approach to the Internet
Over the last two decades, the Internet has become the "newest
frontier for the exercise of the freedom of expression," turning the
computer-user into an "explorer, and perhaps even a settler" of the
World Wide Web.71 Justice Stevens described the Internet as "an in-
ternational network of interconnected computers. '72 Email, auto-
matic mailing list services, newsgroups, chat rooms, and the World
Wide Web constitute "a unique medium ... located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world,
with access to the Internet. '73 The number of host computers 74 in-
creased from 300 in 1981 to approximately 9.4 million in 1996, with
sixty percent of the hosts located in the United States.75 Within a mat-
67. Id. at 282.
68. Id. at 287.
69. Id. It is important to note that the courts in DeRoburt and Bullfrog Films might disagree
with this statement insofar as they are willing to recognize an extensive extraterritorial applica-
tion of the First Amendment. See Bullfrog Films, Inc v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 502 (C.D. Cal.
1986), affd, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 579-80 (D.
Haw. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
70. Laker Airways, 604 F. Supp. at 287.
71. MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1 (rev.
ed. 2003).
72. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
73. Id. at 851. The benefits of the Internet actually serve as a thorn in the side of police states,
such as China. These countries "can't afford not to have [the Internet], because they will fall
behind economically [without it]. But if they have it ... they simply can't control information
the way they once did. And what's really scary about the Internet for regimes such as China's is
that it's interactive, it's alive." FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 68. People are "giving and taking,
chatting and outreaching, uploading ideologies and downloading ideologies, buying and selling-
and doing it all in a way that is virtually impossible to control." Id.
74. Host computers are computers that "store information and relay communications." Reno,




ter of five years, the number of Internet users was expected to jump
from 40 million to over 200 million.76 As of 2006, the actual number
of Internet users globally was 972 million. 77 Thus, the Internet has
changed the ways in which a vast number of people live their lives and
communicate.
Because the Internet is extremely important to the American sys-
tem of free expression, courts have been emphatic that "the Internet
is entitled to the highest level of protection and that attempts to cen-
sor its content or silence its speakers are to be viewed with extreme
disfavor."'78 The Supreme Court has held that speech on the Internet
is "entitled to the ... First Amendment protection afforded to news-
papers and other print publications. '79 In Reno v. ACLU, the Su-
preme Court invalidated key provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). 80 The statute made it a federal crime to
transmit "obscene or indecent messages" to anyone under eighteen
years of age. 81 The Court held that, because the First Amendment is
applicable to speech on the Internet, all First Amendment doctrines
govern the analysis of the speech in question. 82 As such, the Court
found that the restriction on speech was content-based and viewed in
that light, the statute was too vague. 83 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens explained that "the CDA places an unacceptably heavy bur-
den on protected speech" and that such a restriction casts a "dark[]
shadow over free speech, threaten[ing] to torch a large segment of the
Internet community. '8 4 Such a result would not be desirable or
constitutional.
After the Supreme Court invalidated key portions of the CDA,
Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act, which required that
"operators of commercial websites restrict access by children to mate-
rial which the average person 'applying contemporary community
standards' would find is designed to pander to the minors' prurient
interest. '85 In Ashcroft v. ACLU, a federal district court issued a pre-
76. Id.
77. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. § 2(2).
78. Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Democracy and Technology et al. in Support of Appellee
Yahoo!, Inc. at 10, Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2006) (No. 01-17424) [hereinafter Brief of Center for Democracy and Technology]; see
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
79. HART, supra note 37, at 4; see Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
80. Reno, 521 U.S. at 882.
81. Id. at 859.
82. Id. at 870.
83. Id. at 870, 874.
84. Id. at 882.
85. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 11.3.4.6, at 1042 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2000)).
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liminary injunction against its enforcement, which the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed because the statute "would limit speech on
the Internet to that which would be palatable in the most restrictive
state."8 6
The Supreme Court held that the statute was content-based, as it
only applied to sexual content available on the Internet, and therefore
the statute must survive strict scrutiny.87 Justice Kennedy noted in his
opinion for the Court that filters would be preferable to the statute
insofar as they "impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiv-
ing end, not universal restrictions at the source."88 Under such a sys-
tem, "adults without children may gain access to speech they have a
right to see without having to identify themselves or provide their
credit card information. ' 89 Also, "promoting the use of filters does
not condemn as criminal any category of speech, and so the potential
chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much diminished." 90
U.S. courts "have held uniformly that the Internet should receive
the highest degree of First Amendment protection." 91 The Supreme
Court took this position in Reno by applying First Amendment pro-
tections to speech on the Internet equivalent to those for traditional
print media, but it is unclear whether this commitment is as strong as
it seems in light of the available filtering technology. 92 Despite these
concerns, courts have tended to provide high levels of protection for
speech posted on the Internet. 93
86. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of "contemporary community stan-
dards" was not unduly vague. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002)). The
Court allowed the injunction to stand and remanded the case, on which the Third Circuit reaf-
firmed the preliminary injunction. Id. The case was again appealed to the Supreme Court, and
the Court's decision is discussed here.
87. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
88. Id. at 667.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 201, 219-20 (2003) (uphold-
ing a federal statute that provided assistance for Internet filtering technology that blocked access
by all persons to "visual depictions" that constitute "obscenity" or "child pornography," because
adults had the option to have such materials unblocked upon making a request to a librarian).
91. Robert Corn-Revere, Caught in the Seamless Web: Does the Internet's Global Reach Jus-
tify Less Freedom of Speech?, CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPERS No. 71, July 24, 2002, at 1, http://
www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp71.pdf.
92. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667. For a balanced
look at the issue of Internet filtering, compare Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1224-30 (1998) (arguing that Internet filtering is feasible), with Corn-Revere,
supra note 91, at 5-6. See infra notes 151-157 and accompanying text.




The defamation and Internet cases discussed above provide the
starting point for an analysis of how courts should apply the First
Amendment right to speech that is accessible outside the United
States. Part A explores the three approaches courts take to defama-
tion regarding printed materials published abroad and whether these
approaches are a good fit for the Internet. 94 Part B discusses the via-
bility of Internet filtering as an alternative to recognizing free speech
protection abroad. 95 Finally, Part C analyzes the ISP safe harbor pro-
visions of the CDA to determine whether First Amendment protec-
tion is necessary to adequately protect ISPs abroad.96
A. The Application of Defamation Law to the Internet:
A Good Fit?
Although defamation law as applied to print materials provides the
main framework for analyzing the Internet, the two mediums of com-
munication are not completely analogous. The Internet differs sub-
stantially from traditional print media due to the "sheer volume of
information, much of it posted by third parties, and the fact that it is
constantly changing. ' 97 For mass distribution of books or newspapers,
publishers need to take specific actions, such as publishing and distrib-
uting a book, in order to circulate the material. With the Internet,
such intentional action is not always required. Yahoo! can publish
something on its American website, intending the material for Ameri-
can audiences, and that material can be accessed virtually anywhere in
the world. 98 Significant portions of the materials posted on the web-
sites of ISPs are not even posted per se by the ISP.99 Individuals can
post information on ISP websites through message boards, auction
sites, and other forums. Justice Stevens in Reno noted that "[a]ny per-
son or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can
94. See infra notes 97-150 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 151-157 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 158-180 and accompanying text.
97. Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 6. Corn-Revere observes that "[a]ttempting to restrict the
availability of information in certain countries on Yahoo!'s auction website is not the same thing
as declining to publish a book in England because of its plaintiff-friendly libel laws or refusing to
mail an adult video to Tennessee for fear of its Bible-belt obscenity standards." Id.
98. Id. at 3. Yahoo! is an example of how worldwide communication is made possible by the
Internet. Id. Yahoo!'s "home website (http://www.yahoo.com) is accessible globally, even
though its services are in English, are oriented toward a U.S. audience, and are hosted entirely
on servers located in the United States." Id.
99. See infra notes 158-175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the liability of ISPs
when third parties post materials on their websites.
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'publish' information." 100 The spectrum of Internet publishers in-
cludes "government agencies, educational institutions, commercial en-
tities, advocacy groups, and individuals." 10 1 Thomas Friedman refers
to the technological advancement of the Internet and the broad access
to information it has provided as the "democratization of informa-
tion. '10 2 The Internet is truly a unique medium because "[n]o single
organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any
centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be
blocked from the Web. ' 10 3 The differences between print materials
and the Internet conceal an important underlying issue that is com-
mon to both modes of communication: whether speech accessible
abroad is protected by the First Amendment. U.S. courts have at-
tempted to answer this question in the context of print materials
through defamation law. Accordingly, defamation law will provide
the foundation for protecting Internet speech abroad.
As discussed above, defamation case law reveals three main ap-
proaches to dealing with the application of free speech protection
abroad.10 4 First, Laker Airways suggests that there is minimal or no
First Amendment free speech protection for the activities of Ameri-
cans abroad. 10 5 Second, in Desai the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois advocated a sliding scale approach, under which the
level of speech protection abroad depends on whether Americans
constitute the intended audience and whether the speech addresses a
matter of public concern to Americans. 10 6 Third, DeRoburt and Bull-
frog Films recognize First Amendment protection abroad to the same
extent as for speech occurring solely within the United States, absent
some overriding governmental concern. 10 7 These approaches will be
examined in turn.
100. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
101. Id.
102. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 60-72. "The result [of this process] is that never before
in the history of the world have so many people been able to learn about so many other people's
lives, products and ideas." Id. at 67. Publishers have a vast array of options for how they publish
material online. They can "make their material available to the entire pool of Internet users, or
confine access to a selected group, such as those willing to pay for the privilege." Reno, 521 U.S.
at 853.
103. Reno, 521 U.S. at 853.
104. See supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
105. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D.D.C. 1984).
106. Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992).
107. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff d, 847 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1988); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 575-76 (D. Haw. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
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1. The Laker Airways Approach
Laker Airways suggests that there is minimal, if any, free speech
protection for the activities of Americans abroad. 108 In Laker Air-
ways, the plaintiff airline sued foreign airlines for predatory pricing
and business interference.' 09 In its discussion of whether the defend-
ants had First Amendment free speech protection to petition the Brit-
ish government for the redress of their grievances, the court stated, "It
is less clear ... whether even American citizens are protected specifi-
cally by the First Amendment with respect to their activities
abroad."' 10 From the district court's statement, the inference logically
follows that the court views the First Amendment as primarily pro-
tecting American speakers speaking to an American audience.1 ' The
court raises the possibility that the First Amendment only provides
free speech protection within the territorial borders of the United
States.
This understanding of free speech undercuts the importance of the
First Amendment and misreads Supreme Court precedent. In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority:
It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the
character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The
importance to the state and to society of such discussion is so vast,
and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than coun-
terbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may
be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals
must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may
be great.112
Justice Stevens echoed this broad understanding of free speech pro-
tection in his dissent in American Library Ass'n by suggesting that the
First Amendment protects the interest of authors "in reaching the
widest possible audience.""1t 3 Many lower courts have followed the
Supreme Court and adopted the view of a robust First Amendment
freedom of speech by recognizing that American speakers have at
least some degree of protection for speech accessible abroad."14
108. See Laker Airways, 604 F. Supp. at 287.
109. Id. at 282.
110. Id. at 287.
111. See id.
112. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964) (quoting Coleman v. Maclennan, 98
P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908)). The Court recognized that a robust and largely uninhibited First
Amendment right often is important enough to override other competing interests. See id.
113. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 225 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1995); Abdullah v. Sheri-
dan Square Press, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 591, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F.
Supp. 492, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83
[Vol. 58:491
2009] CROSSING THE ELECTRONIC BORDER
Therefore, the court's narrow interpretation of free speech protection
in Laker Airways seems inconsistent with the general trends in First
Amendment case law.
Applying the Laker Airways approach to the Internet would impose
substantial burdens to individuals who post information to websites
accessible abroad and would ultimately chill their speech. 115 With no
First Amendment protection, the judgment of the French court in Ya-
hoo! would be enforceable in the United States. 1 6 This exposure to
liability "would establish a legal framework wherein all websites on
the global Internet potentially are subject to the laws of all other na-
tions, regardless of the extent to which such a requirement conflicts
with the law of the place where the speakers are located.' 1 7 Any
nation would be able to "enforce its legal and cultural 'local commu-
nity standards' on speakers in all other nations."11' 8 Therefore, speech
posted online would have to comply with the laws of every country
that regulates Internet speech.119 Rather than comply with such bur-
dens, "[m]any web publishers and service providers likely would cease
offering content that could run afoul of such restrictions.' 20
For example, Chinese law prohibits Internet content "that guides
people in the wrong direction, is vulgar or low. '121 The Chinese gov-
ernment is trying to use this law to stop online protests and pro-de-
mocracy messages, most of which appear on U.S. websites that are
F.R.D. 574, 580 (D. Haw. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984); Bachchan
v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). Cf Desai v. Hersh,
719 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. II. 1989) (concluding that there can be protection for "extraterrito-
rial publications by persons under the protection of the Constitution," but that this protection
does not necessarily apply to all suits brought in U.S. courts), affd, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992).
115. For the purpose of applying the different defamation law approaches to the Internet, this
Comment focuses on political speech that "is at the core of that protected by the First Amend-
ment." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 11.1.2, at 927. Professor Chemerinsky notes that the
"Supreme Court has spoken of the ability to criticize government and government officers as
'the central meaning of the First Amendment."' Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 273 (1964)). The Court has declared that "[t]he guarantees for speech and press are
not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to
healthy government." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Because courts strontly pro-
tect political speech, it serves as a useful tool of analysis for determining whether First Amend-
ment protections exist for speech accessible abroad. Courts would be more likely to extend free
speech protection abroad to protect political speech than they would lesser protected speech;
thus, political speech can help determine the boundaries of the First Amendment.
116. Cf Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
117. Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 8.
118. Id.
119. There are at least fifty-nine countries that limit freedom of expression online. Id. at 6.
120. Id. at 8. This is exactly what happened with Yahoo!. See infra note 157 and accompany-
ing text.
121. Brief of Center for Democracy and Technology, supra note 78, at 13.
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accessible abroad.122 Chinese Americans would violate the law if they
posted information on Yahoo! or Google message boards supporting a
transition to democracy in China or advocating the declaration of in-
dependence by Taiwan. 123 If a Chinese court entered judgment
against Google, that judgment would be enforceable in the United
States unless American courts recognize First Amendment protection
as contrary public policy. 124 Enforcement of the judgment would di-
rectly inhibit the right of American citizens to speak on political issues
because the websites would not only be accessible abroad but also in
the United States.
In order to comply with the judgment, the ISP would either have to
remove that information from its website altogether, or it would have
to construct a filter that would block access to that information any-
where in China. If the ISP removed the information, Americans
would not be able to access that information, even though they would
have had such access if the material was published in a book in the
United States. 125 If a filter is constructed, it may not be narrowly tai-
lored and thus could incidentally block access to American users.
Forcing ISPs to comply with foreign judgments would chill speech and
limit political debate, as ISPs would be less willing to allow such infor-
mation on their websites in the future. Therefore, the Laker Airways
approach does not provide adequate protection for American speak-
ers or audiences.
2. The Desai Approach
In Desai, an Indian official brought suit against the American au-
thor of a book published in India, alleging that certain passages de-
famed him.1 26 According to the court's analysis, had the defendant
published a book only in India on a topic of little concern in the
United States, "the need for protection of first amendment interests
would be greatly lessened, if not entirely absent. 1' 27 The converse
logically follows: had the materials at issue been published in the
United States, only being incidentally accessible abroad, on a topic of
public interest to American citizens, the need for First Amendment
protection would be at its highest. This approach, then, is best charac-
122. Id. at 13-14.
123. See id. at 14.
124. Cf. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
125. See, e.g., infra note 157 and accompanying text.
126. Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 671-72 (N.D. III. 1989), aff d, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir.
1992).
127. Id. at 676.
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terized as a sliding scale, where First Amendment protection for
speech accessible abroad depends on the place of publication or dis-
semination and whether the content is a matter of public concern in
the United States.
Several difficulties arise when applying this approach to the In-
ternet. First, information posted on a website in the United States is
potentially accessible anywhere in the world; there is no fixed place of
dissemination. 128 Courts could look to the location of ISP servers or
the headquarters of the company posting the materials on their web-
sites. 129 However, anyone with computer access can publish on these
websites. 130 If a French citizen posts something on www.yahoo.com,
under this reasoning, it would be treated as speech of an American
speaker because Yahoo!'s servers are located in California.
It is also difficult to determine the speaker's intended audience.
One approach is to assume that whenever an American posts informa-
tion to a website, she directs that information to an American audi-
ence, regardless of her location when she posts the information. This
argument undercuts the importance and the uniqueness of the In-
ternet as a mode of communication and fails to appreciate that indi-
viduals use the Internet to communicate with others on the opposite
side of the globe. 131 Another approach would be to consider anything
posted on an ISP's U.S. website to be intended for American audi-
ences and anything posted on the French or German websites in-
tended for those respective audiences. This rationale fails to
appreciate the advantages of the Internet, as well. 32
The overarching problem with the Desai analysis, and with trying to
apply the same standards to the Internet as applied to print mediums,
is that this approach relies on an assumption that is no longer com-
pletely true: that people intentionally target specific geographical
128. See Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 3. Robert Corn-Revere notes that "[c]yberspace has
no particular geographical location, has no centralized control point, and is available to anyone,
anywhere in the world with access." Id. This "ambient" and unique feature of the Internet has
strongly influenced U.S. courts. Id.; see, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa.
1996), aftd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
129. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1201-02 (9th Cir. 2006).
130. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
131. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
132. For example, the rationale fails to recognize the ability of individuals to learn foreign
languages. If a U.S. citizen had been learning and practicing French in light of an upcoming trip
to France, she may go on the Yahoo! France website to further her language skills. Another
example is the American academic who goes on foreign websites to research and have access to
primary source documents in the language of a particular country. These examples show that,
even though Yahoo! France is largely aimed at French citizens and Yahoo.corn aimed at Ameri-
cans, this is not always the case.
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audiences when publishing information and that those are the only
locations where such intentions will be realized. 133 At the very least,
this approach creates several difficulties in application to the Internet
that make it unworkable. 134
Suppose that an Iranian American posts a message on an ISP mes-
sage board decrying the Iranian government's harsh, and often deadly,
treatment of homosexuals within its borders.135 The information is
clearly posted on a website by a person physically located within the
United States, but it is difficult to determine the identity of the in-
tended audience. The "author" could have posted the message for
multiple purposes: as a form of protest against the Iranian govern-
ment, as a warning to Iranians of what is happening within their coun-
try despite the reassurances of the state-sponsored media, as
participation in the discussion of U.S. foreign policy towards Iran, or
as a beckoning to the international community and non-governmental
organizations to help end human rights violations within Iran. This
example highlights the impracticability of the approach outlined in
Desai. If an Iranian court were to enter a judgment against the ISP
for allowing access to its citizens of "treasonous propaganda" and
seek its enforcement in the United States, U.S. courts would have to
grapple with these issues.136 The information posted could be aimed
at Iranian audiences but incidentally serve as political speech within
the United States. In this scenario, American courts would still likely
want to recognize protection for this speech because the First Amend-
ment strongly protects political speech.137 The Desai approach leaves
too many unclear variables to reach this result. Arguably, the speech
133. See Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 6.
134. As the world undergoes deeper and more intense globalization, the term "matters of
public concern" will be defined increasingly broadly. As the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis of
1997 shows, events happening in Thailand effect countries thousands of miles away: South
Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, and the United States. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3,
at xi-xv. The world has become so interconnected that not only global events, but also the
domestic politics of other countries, may be considered "matters of public concern."
135. For the news story that inspired this hypothetical, see generally Margaret Wente, A Gay
Iranian in Exile, GLOBE & MAIL (CAN.), Oct. 6, 2007, at A27.
136. Cf Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1217-18 (9th Cir. 2006); Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1192-93 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
137. Cf CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 11.1.2, at 927. Chemerinsky has noted the wide range
of what constitutes political speech: "Virtually everything from comic strips to commercial ad-
vertisements to even pornography can have a political dimension." Id. The refusal to "narrowly
limit the First Amendment . . . reflects the importance of freedom of speech to other topics
ranging from scientific debates to accurate commercial information in the marketplace." Id.
The hypothetical about the Iranian American would fall within these broad parameters, regard-
less of how it is framed.
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is aimed at a foreign audience as a means of protest against a foreign
government. Under Desai, there would be little or no need for First
Amendment protection in this situation. 138 This result is inconsistent
with the robust conversation promised by the First Amendment and
envisioned by Justice Brandeis. 139
3. The DeRoburt and Bullfrog Films Approach
The DeRoburt approach, modified by Bullfrog Films, provides First
Amendment protection abroad to the same extent as within the
United States, unless there is some overriding governmental concern,
such as national security.140 The district court in Bullfrog Films noted
that, even though "[n]o Supreme Court case squarely holds that the
First Amendment applies abroad," the Court has suggested as
much.141 The Supreme Court itself has stated, "When the Govern-
ment reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to pro-
tect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he
happens to be in another land.' 42
The Supreme Court's approach, as a matter of policy, is sensible in
the context of the Internet. Since practically all information posted
online is accessible in the United States, whether intended or not,
there is a direct interest in applying the First Amendment to speech
accessible abroad. 143 Americans should have access to information as
long as it does not violate the First Amendment. In this globalizing
world, Americans need to have access to as much information as pos-
sible in order to stay competitive with other countries, such as China
and India.144 Because information on the Internet is available both
138. Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. I11. 1989), affd, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992).
139. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
140. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 847 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1988); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 575-76 (D. Haw. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
141. Bullfrog Films, 646 F. Supp. at 502-03; see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981).
142. Bullfrog Films, 646 F. Supp. at 503 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957)).
Other courts seem to have adopted this position. See supra note 114.
143. One purpose of the First Amendment's protection of speech is to help further self-gov-
ernance and the functioning of the democratic process. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 11.1.2, at
926-27. Voters need to be able to acquire "the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous
devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express." Id. at 926.
For this reason, "U.S. courts have held uniformly that the Internet should receive the highest
degree of First Amendment protection." Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 1. Not recognizing
First Amendment protection for speech accessible abroad would permit "the seeds of foreign
censorship to be planted on U.S. soil by finding [foreign judgments] enforceable here." Id.
144. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 70. "Today, no country can ever truly cut itself [or its
people] off from the global media or from external sources of information; trends that start in
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abroad and in the United States, foreign judgments that affect infor-
mation to which Americans have access, such as the one entered by
the French court in Yahoo!, should be subject to First Amendment
standards. 145 This approach does not automatically render foreign
judgments unenforceable; rather, it requires that such judgments be
subject to standard First Amendment analysis, so that courts treat the
speech as if it were purely domestic in its scope. Because the Internet
does not recognize geographic borders, neither should the First
Amendment. 46.
The Ninth Circuit noted in Yahoo! that after Yahoo! had filed suit
in federal district court to determine whether the French judgment
was enforceable against it, Yahoo! adopted "a new policy prohibiting
use of auctions or classified advertisements on Yahoo.com 'to offer or
trade in items that are associated with or could be used to promote or
glorify groups that are known principally for hateful and violent posi-
tions directed at others based on race or similar factors."1 47 This new
policy has the potential to limit Americans' access to speech that
passes First Amendment muster. 148 Yahoo!'s reaction shows that
even the possibility that a foreign judgment against an ISP is enforcea-
ble in the United States may have a chilling effect on speech. 49 If
U.S. courts did not apply the First Amendment extraterritorially, but
instead regularly recognized foreign judgments against ISPs, Ameri-
cans would not have access to significant amounts of information on
the Internet. For this reason, the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California stated, "Absent a body of law that establishes inter-
national standards with respect to speech on the Internet and an
appropriate treaty or legislation addressing enforcement of such stan-
dards to speech originating within the United States, the principle of
one corner of the world are rapidly replicated thousands of miles away." Id. "A country trying
to opt out of the global economy by cutting itself off from external trade and capital flows will
still have to deal with the fact that the expectations of its population are shaped by their aware-
ness of living standards and cultural products emerging from the outside world." Id.
145. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192-93 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
146. See Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 3, 6.
147. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205
(9th Cir. 2006).
148. The Illinois Supreme Court found that a parade through a municipality by Neo-Nazis in
uniforms exhibiting the swastika did not violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
even though the speech might offend nearby listeners, many of whom were Jewish. Skokie v.
Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 26 (I11. 1978). This case suggests that the U.S. Su-
preme Court would likely protect speech regarding the Neo-Nazi movement and Holocaust de-
nial as political speech. As such, Americans would be entitled to the materials that Yahoo!
prohibited through its policy change coinciding with the Yahoo! litigation.
149. See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205.
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comity is outweighed by the.-Court's obligation to uphold the First
Amendment." 150
B. Internet Filtering as an Alternative
Internet filters are a potential alternative to U.S. courts' recognition
of First Amendment free speech protection abroad. In American Li-
brary Ass'n, the Supreme Court expressed a preference for Internet
filtering for harmful materials rather than an outright ban.151 Some
scholars have argued that a balancing approach to Internet issues, sim-
ilar to that laid out in Desai, requires ISPs to use Internet filtering
where access to particular information or speech violates domestic
law. 152 However, "the real world is not so amenable to such neat solu-
tions that sound plausible only in academic journals.1' 53 If this view
were adopted, "an Internet publisher or web host [would have to] cre-
ate filters to block access to any content that is illegal in the jurisdic-
tions in which its service is available-that is, everywhere."1 54 That
would be an extremely daunting task for ISPs. As of now, at least
fifty-nine different countries limit freedom of expression on the In-
ternet.1 55 If ISPs had to use filtering mechanisms so as not to violate
local laws across the globe, "publishers would have to code each item
of information they posted (or otherwise made available) to meet
each of the national standards, and set their geographic filters to block
access to the content in the relevant jurisdictions.' ' 156
Even if the filtering technology were available, ISPs should not be
required to utilize the technology. Free speech protection should exist
for materials accessible abroad regardless of whether filtering technol-
ogy exists because having to provide different filtering mechanisms in
every jurisdiction that limits free expression on the Internet would
substantially burden ISPs and most likely limit Americans' access to
150. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1193. For a proposal of an international treaty on Internet
speech, see infra notes 230-249 and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 208 (2003). The Court explained,
"because of the vast quantity of material on the Internet and the rapid pace at which it changes,
libraries cannot possibly segregate, item by item, all the Internet material that is appropriate for
inclusion from all that is not." Id. The library has the option of limiting "its Internet collection
to just those sites it found worthwhile" but doing so would exclude "an enormous amount of
valuable information that it lacks the capacity to review." Id. Thus, rather than excluding too
much information because the library lacks the ability or the resources to comb through it all,
the Court thought that utilizing filtering software was a reasonable and preferable alternative.
152. Jack Goldsmith, Yahoo! Brought to Earth, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2000. at 27.
153. Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 6.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. ISPs would also have to adapt as countries change their domestic Internet law to
keep up with emerging technologies.
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speech. For example, assuming that the relevant filtering technology
does exist, or will exist at some point, Yahoo! could have developed
filters so that French citizens would not be able to access Nazi propa-
ganda or materials supporting denial of the Holocaust. Yahoo! had
this option, but it chose instead to change its policy and limit the type
of information posted on its websites regarding these topics alto-
gether. 157 When ISPs are confronted with cumbersome and expensive
options, ISPs will typically restrict speech across the board to save
time and money. By requiring ISPs to use filtering technology, courts
will ultimately limit access to speech. As the Yahoo! example high-
lights, there is not only a risk of this result, but a substantial
probability.
C. The Extent of ISP Liability for Materials
Posted to Their Websites
U.S. courts should also recognize free speech protection for materi-
als posted on the Internet that are accessible abroad because such pro-
tection is necessary to ensure that ISPs enjoy immunity when third
parties post information to ISP websites. This immunity exemplifies
the high levels of speech protection that United States courts have
extended to the Internet and should continue to extend in the future.
In order to fully appreciate the role that the First Amendment plays in
guaranteeing ISP immunity, a brief discussion of the history of third-
party liability and the CDA safe harbor provisions is necessary.
Traditionally, courts have recognized a distinction between publish-
ers, distributors, and common carriers. 158 Publishers, "such as news-
papers, magazines, and broadcasters, control the content of their
publications and are, accordingly, held legally responsible for any
libelous material they publish. ' 159 In contrast, distributors, "such as
bookstores, libraries, and newsstands, cannot be held liable for a state-
ment contained in the materials they distribute unless 'they knew or
had reason to know of the defamatory statement at issue."160 Dis-
tributors have no duty to read through materials that they are selling
in order to detect such defamatory statements. 161 Common carriers
"such as telephone companies ... do no more than provide facilities
by which third parties may communicate," and they "cannot be held
157. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205
(9th Cir. 2006).
158. See HART, supra note 37, at 250.
159. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977)).
160. Id. (quoting Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (E.D. Wash. 1992)).
161. Id. at 250-51.
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liable for defamatory statements communicated through [their] facili-
ties unless they have participated in preparing the defamatory mate-
rial. ' 162 Prior to the enactment of the CDA, courts were faced with
determining whether ISPs were publishers, distributors, or common
carriers.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.163 is illustrative of
the process for determining the extent of ISP liability for speech
posted online. In Stratton Oakmont, an unidentified user posted alleg-
edly libelous statements on Prodigy's "Money Talk" computer bulletin
board, claiming that Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment bank-
ing firm, and its president were involved in criminal activities.' 64
Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy on ten different counts, including per
se libel.1 65 The main issue in the case was whether Prodigy was a
"publisher" of the statement posted by the unidentified user.' 66 The
New York Superior Court held that Prodigy was a publisher rather
than a distributor for two reasons.1 67 First, Prodigy "held itself out to
the public and its members as controlling the content of its computer
bulletin boards."'1 68 Second, Prodigy used an automatic screening pro-
gram and employees to delete notes from its computer bulletin board
that were offensive or in "bad taste.' 69 By taking these actions, Prod-
igy made decisions about the content posted on its bulletin board and
thus acted as a publisher.1 70 Prodigy "had made a 'conscious choice'
to regulate the content of its bulletin boards and thereby exposed it-
self to greater potential liability than other computer networks that
undertook a less active role.' 171
In response to Stratton Oakmont, Congress enacted "sweeping and
far-reaching protections" for ISPs in order to "encourage continued
private investment in, and free discussion on, the Internet.' 72 Section
230 of the CDA provides that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
162. Id. at 251 (citing Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 361 N.Y.S.2d 913, 913 (N.Y. 1974)).
163. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id.
169. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
170. Id. The court noted, "Indeed, it could be said that Prodigy's current system of automatic
scanning, Guidelines and Board Leaders may have a chilling effect on freedom of communica-
tion in Cyberspace, and it appears that this chilling effect is exactly what Prodigy wants, but for
the legal liability that attaches to such censorship." Id. at *5.
171. HART, supra note 37, at 252.
172. Id. at 253.
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information provided by another information content provider. '173
Therefore, Congress effectively overruled Stratton Oakmont by pro-
viding that ISPs are not publishers and thus are not liable for informa-
tion posted on their websites by other users. Most courts have applied
"[s]ection 230 broadly, ruling that ISPs and those operating websites
generally enjoy immunity from liability. As long as the material com-
plained of was written by a third party, rather than an agent or em-
ployee of the ISP or website, the ISP or website is immune from
liability. ' 174 The Fourth Circuit has held that an ISP cannot be held
liable for failing to remove a libelous statement posted on its website
by a third party, even if the ISP was notified that it was distributing
such a statement.175 Accordingly, ISPs enjoy substantial domestic
protections from liability for speech posted on their websites by third
parties.
ISPs do not enjoy equivalent protection abroad. As seen in Yahoo!,
foreign judiciaries are willing to hold ISPs liable for speech that vio-
lates the laws of the particular country but was posted by a third
party.176 Internet users could post information on Yahoo!'s auction
websites regarding the sale of Nazi memorabilia and not be held liable
for violating foreign laws. Yahoo!, however, would have to suffer the
consequences of its users' actions in foreign jurisdictions, although it
would be protected from such consequences in the United States.177
Some form of free speech protection is necessary to prevent these
results. If the United States government wants to foster the free ex-
change of ideas and not hold ISPs liable for the actions of third par-
ties,178 it should adopt the Global Free Speech Act, 179 or at least urge
U.S. courts to recognize First Amendment free speech protections
abroad. Absent such steps, foreign countries will greatly dilute the
value of ISP protection under the CDA when courts enter judgments
against ISPs. Foreign courts are already claiming jurisdiction over the
Internet, entering judgments against U.S. citizens and entities, and re-
jecting First Amendment protection. 80 For this reason, U.S. courts
173. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
174. HART, supra note 37, at 253.
175. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1997); see also HART, supra note 37, at
253.
176. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1202-04
(9th Cir. 2006).
177. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
178. See HART, supra note 37, at 253.
179. See infra notes 230-249 and accompanying text.
180. See Patti Waldmer, Material Published on the Internet and Thus Accessible Anywhere in
the World is Increasingly Being Challenged under the Laws of Individual Nation States, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at 19 (discussing some of these foreign cases). It is important to note that
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should extend free speech protection to speech that is accessible
abroad via the Internet.
IV. SEEKING AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FREE
SPEECH PROTECTION
In light of the Internet's significance in modern society and the lack
of uniform international standards to protect speech online, ISPs will
have to comply with the laws of potentially every country where
materials posted on their websites are accessible. This would force
ISPs to take a "lowest common denominator" approach in deciding
what information to make accessible. 181 If Yahoo! had to ensure that
its home website complied with the laws of every country in which the
website could be accessed, Yahoo! would have to restrict the informa-
tion that it allowed users to post, thereby limiting Americans' access
to such information. 182
Without the imprimatur of the U.S. Supreme Court, many lower
courts may be reluctant to recognize free speech protection beyond
the borders of the United States. Americans and ISPs would be ex-
posed to liability all over the world and forced to censor their activi-
ties in order to abide by foreign laws. The current state of Internet
regulation, where at least fifty-nine different countries regulate ex-
pression on the Internet under different standards, can best be charac-
terized as a system of "inconsistent regulation of Internet content"
that acts a lot like a "customs duty" when users access Internet speech
across different borders.183 Adoption of the Global Free Speech Act
might encourage hesitant courts to take the final leap and fully protect
the speech of Americans and ISPs in the Internet Age so that they are
not forced to navigate this patchwork of national Internet regulation.
foreign courts are taking these positions against U.S. interests even before American courts have
declined to enforce foreign judgments on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co.
v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.) (holding that Dow Jones was within the jurisdiction of
the Australian courts in a defamation suit that was predicated upon material posted on the In-
ternet via servers located in the United States). Applying the First Amendment abroad in the
context of the Internet may thus be necessary to protect the rights of American speakers and
audiences from the speech-restrictive measures that are being implemented abroad.
181. Brief of Center for Democracy and Technology, supra note 78, at 20; see also Carl S.
Kaplan, New Economy: Bracing for a Flood of Efforts to Control Speech Seen as Hateful or
Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at C3.
182. Corn-Revere, supra note 91, at 4. Yahoo! "epitomizes the type of worldwide communi-
cation made possible on the Internet" insofar as Yahoo!'s home website, http://www.yahoo.com,
is "accessible globally, even though its services are in English, are oriented toward a U.S. audi-
ence, and are hosted entirely on servers located in the United States." Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 6, 8.
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If U.S. courts recognize free speech protection abroad, foreign judg-
ments will be unenforceable in the United States. Adoption of the
Global Free Speech Act is necessary, nonetheless, because Americans
will still be violating laws abroad. If an American citizen unknowingly
violated the Internet speech restrictions in China and then traveled to
Beijing, for example, she could potentially be arrested for breaking
Chinese law. Free speech protection embodied in an international
agreement is important not only to protect the First Amendment
rights of Americans in these situations but also to create certain basic
free speech standards around the globe, much as the Berne Conven-
tion 18 4 has done for copyright law. This Part explores the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as the foundation for a global free
speech right, 85 the history and principles of the Berne Convention, 186
and the possibility of using those principles in crafting a Global Free
Speech Act. 187
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Its Progeny
In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, t88 which was one of the first expressions of international free
speech protection. Its goal was to enshrine human dignity and create
"an international standard by which to identify the basic rights that
every person should enjoy."'1 89 According to Article 19 of the Decla-
ration, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers."'190 This provision recognizes two basic
rights: the right of speakers to self-expression and the right of an au-
dience to receive information. The question of whether these rights
offer the same level of protection for free expression as the First
Amendment has never been explicitly determined, although the fact
that practically no other country protects speech to as great an extent
as the United States suggests that a broad reading of Article 19 is
184. Berne Convention, supra note 2.
185. See infra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 203-229 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 230-249 and accompanying text.
188. LINDA FASULO, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE UN 15 (2004).
189. Id. at 16.
190. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
518 [Vol. 58:491
CROSSING THE ELECTRONIC BORDER
unwarranted. 191 Regardless, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is not a treaty; thus, it is not legally binding on the member
states of the United Nations.192 The provisions of the Declaration
have been codified, though, in two treaties that are binding: the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.193
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides that all people have the right to freedom of expres-
sion, which includes "freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice. 1 94 This right is subject to restrictions imposed by national
governments that are necessary for "respect of the rights or reputa-
tions of others" or for "the protection of national security or of public
order, or of public health or morals."'1 95 The scope of free speech pro-
tection in the United States is more expansive than that recognized in
this treaty, as some of the treaty's restrictions are not permissible
under the First Amendment.1 96 The U.S. Senate recognized the dis-
parity between the treaty and First Amendment protection when it
determined that the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights "does not authorize or require legislation or other action by
the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and asso-
ciation protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.' 97 Members of the European Union, among other countries,
have made similar reservations.' 98 These reservations show that na-
191. Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of
the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377, 379 (recognizing that "the constitutional protection af-
forded to freedom of speech in the United States is seemingly unparalleled anywhere else in the
world").
192. FASULO, supra note 188, at 16.
193. Id.
194. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
195. Id. art. 19(3).
196. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (holding that an allegedly vulgar
four-letter expletive on the back of an individual's jacket is protected by the First Amendment).
197. S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 11 (1978).
198. For example, France and Germany declared that the Covenant would be implemented in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Declarations and Reservations,
http://www2.ohchr.orgfEnglishlbodies/ratification14_1.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). The Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides a
laundry list of possible limitations or restrictions on the freedom of expression. The exercise of
the freedoms may be subject to:
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tional sovereignty plays an important role in the negotiation of inter-
national agreements.' 99
The statements of the U.S. Senate and the members of the Euro-
pean Union suggest that a Global Free Speech Act would be practi-
cally impossible to craft, as there is no consensus among the members
of the global community as to how much speech, if any, should be
protected. This assumption is misguided, and it does not reflect the
emerging reality. Professors Mayer-Schbnberger and Foster note that
"[w]hile speech has never enjoyed-and will never enjoy-absolute
protection, the principle of freedom of speech has become part of a
minimum standard of freedoms among a majority of nations. ' 200 Sev-
eral significant international and regional agreements protect the right
of both speakers and audiences to free expression, reflecting an inter-
national consensus on what is now considered a human right. 20' Thus,
the "[r]apidly growing realities of global interdependence" have led to
a situation where "freedom of expression ... possesses a contingent
universality. '20 2 These observations of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and its progeny show that the foundations for a Global
Free Speech Act are rooted in international law and that such an in-
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integ-
rity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
10(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
199. For a fascinating yet controversial discussion of the status of national sovereignty in the
Internet age, see generally Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the
Information Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2004).
200. Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger & Teree E. Foster, A Regulatory Web: Free Speech and the
Global Information Infrastructure, 3 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 45, 57 (1997).
201. Wimmer, supra note 23, at 203. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 194, art. 19; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, supra note 198, art. 10; American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov.
21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 9, June 27,
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
202. Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of
Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29, 30-31
(1997). Professor An-Na'im explains that the "element of contingency" is dependent on the
interplay between domestic and international affairs:
National standards and practice are the bases of international standards and the neces-
sary context of their implementation. Yet national standards and practices are in turn
affected by international responses to the poor articulation or persistent violation of
human rights at the local level. International recognition of the universality of freedom
of expression equally influences, and is affected by, the local national dynamics of artic-
ulation, legitimation, and mediation of this and other human rights.
Id. at 30.
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ternational agreement is possible. The Berne Convention provides
the roadmap to its realization.
B. The History and Principles of the Berne Convention
The circumstances leading to the adoption of the Berne Conven-
tion 20 3 bear striking similarity to the current patchwork of national
Internet regulation that exists today. Thus, a discussion of the history
and principles of the Berne Convention is instructive for the creation
of a Global Free Speech Act. One of the main causes for the develop-
ment of copyright law was the invention of the printing press by
Gutenberg in 1436, which significantly increased the rate at which au-
thors' manuscripts could be copied but also paved the way for piracy
of these manuscripts. 20 4 Pirate booksellers would copy books that had
already been legitimately published and then would "sell these copied
books at lower prices since they could avoid paying for the authors'
manuscripts. ' 20 5 This motivated booksellers to lobby their respective
governments for some form of protection, resulting in the enactment
of national copyright laws.20 6 Prior to the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, the copyright laws of most European countries extended protec-
tion only insofar as they granted privileges or monopolies to
publishers and printers, rather than authors, for the printing of partic-
ular books. 207
The one exception was the copyright law of the United Kingdom,
known as the Act of Anne, which initially only provided protection
for books when it was enacted in 1709 but was extended piecemeal to
cover engravings, sculptures, and dramatic works by the time most
other European countries were just enacting their first copyright stat-
utes.208 The concept of authors having rights to their work, especially
in the form of exclusive rights to reproduction, was born out of the
French Revolution and the fall of the "ancien r6gime. °20 9 By 1886,
almost all European countries had copyright statutes that protected
authors' rights to some extent.210 One major problem, however, arose
from the enactment of these laws. While "the principal issues ad-
203. Berne Convention, supra note 2.
204. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. &
TECH. 1, 3 (1988).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 4.
207. Sam Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 9-10
(1986).
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at 10.
210. Id. The United States had enacted its first copyright statute in 1791. Id.
2009]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
dressed by [the] national laws were the same, the solutions adopted
were often quite different," especially with regard to the rights
granted to authors, the subject matter protected, and the duration of
that protection.211 Because of the varying protection offered by this
patchwork of national laws and the piracy of foreign works, the inter-
national community began to focus its attention on international copy-
right arrangements. 212
International copyright protection began in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury in the form of bilateral treaties that provided for mutual recogni-
tion of copyright rights.2 13 These treaties were often inadequate to
protect the original works of authors, though, because they "were
neither comprehensive enough nor of a uniform pattern. 2 14 The
"network of bilateral agreements" made an author's protection
outside his home country unpredictable because there were wide dis-
crepancies regarding formalities, the duration of particular conven-
tions, and the insertion of "most favored nation" clauses, among other
issues.215 The inadequacies of the bilateral treaty system eventually
led to the adoption of the Berne Convention on September 9, 1866.216
The Berne Convention is the oldest international copyright treaty,
and it is open to all countries. 217 The goal of the Convention is to
"protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights
of authors in their literary and artistic works. '218 Article 1 imple-
ments this goal by creating a union "for the protection of the rights of
authors in their literary and artistic works" that consists of all the
211. Id. at 11.
212. Id. at 11, 13. The increase in worldwide literary activity intensified the need for interna-
tional copyright protection. See Burger, supra note 204, at 8 ("Increased numbers of authors'
works began to cross national boundaries, and because authors were unprotected in foreign
countries, their literary works were easy targets of piracy.").
213. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK:
POLICY, LAW AND USE 262 (2d ed. 2004). Ricketson notes that the basis of these bilateral agree-
ments "came closer to what is called 'material' or substantive reciprocity under which there is
approximate parity between the level of protection accorded by each state to the works of the
other." Ricketson, supra note 207, at 15. Under these agreements, "country A would grant
country B's authors the same protection as country B would grant country A's authors." Burger,
supra note 204, at 8-9.
214. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 213, at 262.
215. Ricketson, supra note 207, at 15-16; see also supra note 211 and accompanying text.
216. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 213, at 262. For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the events leading up to the adoption of the Berne Convention, see generally Ricketson,
supra note 207.
217. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 213, at 262. The United States signed
the Convention in 1988 and accordingly amended the 1976 Copyright Act to conform to interna-
tional standards. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 202 (2007); see Berne Con-
vention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
218. Berne Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
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countries that have become a party to the Convention. 219 All mem-
bers of the copyright union are expected to adhere to certain mini-
mum standards of protection, such as allowing protection for "any
original production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression" and granting the
author exclusive rights to translate, reproduce, and perform the work
for the duration of the author's life plus fifty years.220
The Berne Convention rests on three basic principles. 221 First,
under the principle of national treatment, 222 "[a]uthors shall enjoy, in
respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention,
in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights
which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their
nationals. ' 223 Thus, an American author who enjoys copyright protec-
tion in the United States would be entitled to the same level of copy-
right protection in Germany as a German citizen would have, and vice
versa. Second, the Convention provides for automatic protection that
does not require the fulfillment of any formal requirements. 224 This
means that "protection is granted automatically and is not subject to
the formality of registration, deposit or the like," 225 including notice of
copyright protection. Third, according to the principle of indepen-
dence of protection, "enjoyment and exercise of the rights granted is
independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of
the work. '226
As "one of the most enduring of all international agreements," 227
the Berne Convention has successfully transformed a world character-
ized by literary piracy, a patchwork of national regulation, and a loss
of protection upon crossing borders into one of relative harmony, sta-
bility, and predictability. 228 Its "standard of protection is higher than
any other international copyright convention," it continues to attract
219. Id. art. 1.
220. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 213, at 262-64.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5. Under a system of national treatment, "country
A grants authors from country B the same protection that country A grants its own authors."
Burger, supra note 204, at 9.
224. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 213, at 263.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Burger, supra note 204, at 1.
228. Cf id. at 50 ("Throughout its ... history, the Union has developed a resilient character
that has allowed it to endure, despite manifold pressures stemming from philosophical and eco-
nomic differences, new technologies, or the political urge to favor easy access to information
over the authors' right to control their creations.").
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new signatories, and is "flexible enough to cope with new technologies
and the divesting threats they pose to authors' rights. '22 9 The Berne
Convention has created a workable, uniform system of regulation in
the midst of circumstances similar to those facing the global commu-
nity with the Internet today, and thus the Berne Convention is per-
haps the best model for crafting a solution.
C. Solution: The Global Free Speech Act
The purpose of the Global Free Speech Act is to set up a union,
similar to that of the Berne Convention, where minimum standards of
free speech protection exist for the Internet. As discussed above, the
adoption of such an agreement is feasible because the international
community already recognizes some level of free expression as a norm
of international law.2 30 Thus, the bulk of the negotiations will not be
focused on the creation of a free speech union itself, but rather on the
standard of protection to be guaranteed within that union. This Com-
ment recommends that the international community adopt a Global
Free Speech Act in some form and suggests three possible standards
of protection: (1) the model adopted by the European Union (EU)
under the E-Commerce Directive; (2) the model proposed by the U.S.
House of Representatives in the Global Online Freedom Act of 2006;
and (3) the international law concept of jus cogens. These proposals
not only provide solutions to some of the central issues raised by the
Yahoo! litigation, but they also make the promises of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights a reality.231
1. The European Union Model
The EU's approach under the E-Commerce Directive is one possi-
ble model for the Global Free Speech Act.232 The E-Commerce Di-
rective takes the "country of origin" approach and provides that
''companies are subjected only to the jurisdiction and the law of the
Member State in which they are established. ' 233 For example, the
German magazine Der Spiegel would only be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of German courts and the laws of Germany rather than being
potentially liable in every country that restricts content on the In-
ternet. If adopted on a global scale, this approach would provide sim-
plicity and predictability because companies would know the extent of
229. Id. at 50-51.
230. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
232. See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1.
233. Wimmer, supra note 23, at 210.
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their legal liability and with which domestic laws they would need to
comply. There is, however, an important limitation on the legislation:
in its current state, it "applies only to electronic commerce activities
within the EU. '234
Also, courts may struggle to determine the "country of origin" for
legal purposes because "reporters, photojournalists, and editors can
upload electronic information to a publication from literally anywhere
on the globe and the location of servers hosting content can be
manipulated easily to locate foreign content in a jurisdiction where it
may be safely published. ' 235 In this regard, the E-Commerce Direc-
tive explains that the focus of the determination as to where a com-
pany is established should be on "the source of the activity" and that
"it is essential to state clearly where the services originate. ' 236 Thus,
in an attempt to simplify this determination, the Global Free Speech
Act could require companies to register the country in which they are
"established" with some type of permanent body. The EU's approach
"is sensible because only the country in which a publisher is 'estab-
lished' can fully regulate its activities"; also, it "is sensitive to general
principles of international law, which recognize that one state should
not prescribe its laws in a manner that interferes with a sister state's
ability to prescribe its own legal concepts. '237
2. The Global Online Freedom Act Model
The Global Free Speech Act could also take the approach of some
members of the U.S. House of Representatives, as set out in the
Global Online Freedom Act, and require that all countries "promote
the ability of all [people] to access and contribute information, ideas,
and knowledge via the Internet and to advance the right to receive
and impart information and ideas through any media.., regardless of
frontiers. ' 238 This provision, if incorporated into the Global Free
Speech Act, would turn the promises of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights into binding obligations for all signatories to protect
free speech on the Internet. 239 This provision alone would not be a
sufficient basis for a Global Free Speech Act, as it would practically
replicate the obligations agreed to by the international community in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.240
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 22, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1).
237. Id. at 210-11.
238. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. § 101(1).
239. See supra text accompanying note 190.
240. See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
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Another provision in the Global Online Freedom Act would make
the Global Free Speech Act a very effective instrument. The provi-
sion, in its current state, provides that "[ilt shall be the policy of the
United States to prohibit any United States businesses from cooperat-
ing with officials of Internet-restricting countries in effecting the polit-
ical censorship of online content."'241 If every signatory to the Global
Free Speech Act would agree to enact national legislation prohibiting
its businesses from cooperating with countries that restrict content on
the Internet, companies ultimately would isolate those countries that
regulate the Internet and put pressure on them to allow free speech
on the Internet. Complying with the judgment of a court in a country
that restricts expression on the Internet could arguably be viewed as
cooperating with those countries. Thus, a possible corollary to the
Global Free Speech Act would be for signatories to agree not to en-
force foreign judgments within their borders if the judgment is based
on the repression or censorship of speech on the Internet. 242 This ar-
rangement would resemble the Berne Union to the degree that it
would create an area of the globe where minimum standards of free
speech protection would exist and accord different treatment to those
countries outside of the Union, a group largely comprised of countries
that restrict content on the Internet.
3. The Jus Cogens Model
The Global Free Speech Act could also model the international law
principle of jus cogens. As Dutch jurist Huig de Grotius explained,
nations do not "conduct[ ] their affairs in chaos, devoid of any under-
lying universal principles" but instead rely on "binding rules of inter-
national conduct-a common law among nations that binds them. '243
Thus, jus cogens recognizes that there are international norms based
upon natural law principles that "function[ ] as a set of mutual links
tying nations together."' 244 Professors Mayer-Schbnberger and Foster
discuss a system of global Internet regulation based on jus cogens:
241. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. § 101(3).
242. Any serious consideration of this corollary by the international community should in-
clude a discussion of the possible effects the proposal would have on the principle of comity. See
supra note 20.
243. Mayer-Sch6nberger & Foster, supra note 200, at 58.
244. Id. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines jus cogens as "a norm ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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[A] method should be devised for defining certain categories of
speech that will be subject to regulation, while at the same time
staunchly protecting all speech not within these categories. Essen-
tially, regulatory lines should be drawn circumspectly, so that only
speech that is encompassed within certain specified and narrow con-
fines can be regulated on the basis of its content. All speech outside
these narrow boundaries should be assiduously sheltered from con-
tent-based regulation. 245
Because there are not many categories of speech that would qualify as
international norms, a Global Free Speech Act based on jus cogens
would provide protection for most areas of speech on the Internet
except for those few areas that the international community agrees
should be regulated. 246 Thus, under this formulation of the Global
Free Speech Act, "only speech that advocated clearly reprehensible
behavior, e.g., piracy, genocide, apartheid, aggressive warfare, terror-
ism, and torture, could be constrained. '247 A system of global In-
ternet regulation based on this approach would hopefully resemble
the Berne Union both in its organization as a union of countries guar-
anteeing a minimum standard of protection and in its success as a uni-
form yet flexible system of international regulation.
These approaches resolve many of the critical problems posed by
the Yahoo! litigation, but they also leave other issues unanswered.
The formulations discussed here simply provide a starting point for
the international dialogue, but the list is by no means exhaustive.
Other frameworks are workable, so long as they maintain the essential
character of the Internet as "the one true global medium of communi-
cation '2 48 and protect freedom of expression for Americans and
global society at large. 249
245. Mayer-Sch6nberger & Foster, supra note 200, at 57.
246. See id. at 60.
247. Id.
248. Wimmer, supra note 23, at 203.
249. Kurt Wimmer discusses several frameworks that would be unacceptable:
Publishers could adopt strict "in country only" approaches to their works, limiting their
availability to individuals outside their borders if the risk of the application of foreign
law against them becomes too great. Another option for publishers is to adopt "the
least common denominator" approach to publishing, under which the speech standards
of the most restrictive country with a nexus to a particular piece of expression would
define the standards by which that expression will be published. Governments also can
impose barriers, as Singapore and China have, that would limit their own citizens' ac-
cess to information published outside of their borders (and information published in-
side their borders with which their governments disagree). But ultimately, the
widespread adoption of any of these strategies means that the essential character of the
Internet will be altered and its capacity to act as a universal source of information will
be lost.




The United States must protect ISPs and American citizens from
the enforcement of foreign judgments when they post content online.
As Justice Brandeis noted in his Whitney opinion: "Those who won
our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized ... that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination. '250 This danger materializes when
courts do not clearly define the status of the First Amendment's scope
abroad and the ability of Americans to speak and receive information
on the Internet. In order for the promises of the Internet and First
Amendment free speech protection to be realized, U.S. courts should
refuse to enforce foreign judgments against ISPs or American citizens
for the violation of foreign statutes that restrict expression on the In-
ternet. Foreign courts are already holding U.S.-based ISPs liable for
speech accessible abroad. A robust debate on political issues should
not be extinguished because ISPs would rather avoid posting informa-
tion on the Internet than run the risk of violating the laws of other
countries. Because lower courts are reluctant to recognize free speech
protection abroad without the guidance of the U.S. Supreme Court,
the best alternative for the U.S. government is to push for the adop-
tion of the Global Free Speech Act. The importance "to the state and
to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived
are so great" 251 that it should not be sacrificed in the name of national
interests.
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